Legislature(2015 - 2016)BARNES 124
02/12/2016 01:00 PM House RESOURCES
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB247 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| *+ | HB 246 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | HB 177 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 247 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED |
HB 247-TAX;CREDITS;INTEREST;REFUNDS;O & G
1:08:04 PM
CO-CHAIR TALERICO announced that the only order of business is
HOUSE BILL NO. 247, "An Act relating to confidential information
status and public record status of information in the possession
of the Department of Revenue; relating to interest applicable to
delinquent tax; relating to disclosure of oil and gas production
tax credit information; relating to refunds for the gas storage
facility tax credit, the liquefied natural gas storage facility
tax credit, and the qualified in-state oil refinery
infrastructure expenditures tax credit; relating to the minimum
tax for certain oil and gas production; relating to the minimum
tax calculation for monthly installment payments of estimated
tax; relating to interest on monthly installment payments of
estimated tax; relating to limitations for the application of
tax credits; relating to oil and gas production tax credits for
certain losses and expenditures; relating to limitations for
nontransferable oil and gas production tax credits based on oil
production and the alternative tax credit for oil and gas
exploration; relating to purchase of tax credit certificates
from the oil and gas tax credit fund; relating to a minimum for
gross value at the point of production; relating to lease
expenditures and tax credits for municipal entities; adding a
definition for "qualified capital expenditure"; adding a
definition for "outstanding liability to the state"; repealing
oil and gas exploration incentive credits; repealing the
limitation on the application of credits against tax liability
for lease expenditures incurred before January 1, 2011;
repealing provisions related to the monthly installment payments
for estimated tax for oil and gas produced before January 1,
2014; repealing the oil and gas production tax credit for
qualified capital expenditures and certain well expenditures;
repealing the calculation for certain lease expenditures
applicable before January 1, 2011; making conforming amendments;
and providing for an effective date."
1:08:29 PM
KEN ALPER, Director, Tax Division, Department of Revenue (DOR),
provided a sectional analysis of HB 247 on behalf of the
governor. He said Sections 1-5 all refer to a repealer. Alaska
statute includes some exploration tax credit programs that go
back several decades that are dormant, have not been used, and
in some cases the appropriate regulatory structure of the rules
have not even been developed. Many of the alternative credits
for exploration in AS 43.55.025 are sunsetting and the
administration wanted to make sure that these dormant programs
didn't get resurrected, brought to life, while a separate set of
benefits for exploration remains in place. Section 40, the
repealer section of the bill, is a repeal of AS 43.05.180(i) and
different sections of AS 41.09; in doing so, there are other
places in statute where those are referenced as part of a
general reference in another concept. The specifics of Sections
1-5 talk about the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and
DNR's ability to audit royalties; it makes reference to these
credits so those sections are being amended to reflect the
repealing of those sections elsewhere in the statute. It
doesn't change the underlying ability of DNR to audit royalties.
1:10:50 PM
MR. ALPER explained that Section 6 is a conforming change to
Section 8. Section 8 is a substantive piece that has to do with
the limited waiver of confidentiality, the ability of the state
to report on the credits that it is spending, the companies that
are receiving it, and the projects.
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER inquired whether the substantive portion
of the bill begins with Section 8.
MR. ALPER replied that the substantive portion begins with
Section 7. But, because Section 6 is a conforming section that
refers to Section 8, he skipped to Section 8 to better describe
Section 6.
MR. ALPER returned to his presentation, reiterating that Section
8 talks about confidentiality waivers and Section 6 talks about
what is confidential. It is part of the core "we keep taxpayer
information confidential statutes" that describe that activity.
There is limited waiver language that says what is and isn't
confidential. That is being modified to include the new section
that's added by Section 8 of the bill. So, Section 8 is purely
conforming in that sense, which he will discuss in a moment.
1:12:13 PM
MR. ALPER turned to Section 7, noting that it is the interest
rate change, which is in the general tax statutes, AS 43.05, and
applies not just to oil and gas but to all taxes collected by
the state. It is the interest rate that the state collects for
anything coming from a delinquency, an assessment, or a past due
tax that is determined to be owed. It is one of the core issues
that the Department of Revenue (DOR) deals with when it comes to
collecting money. He pointed out that that number also works
the same in reverse. When someone overpays their taxes, or they
pay their tax and then appeal an assessment and win that appeal,
[the state] pays them back with interest at the same interest
rate that is charged for a taxpayer's short payments. Mr. Alper
reviewed the legislative history on the interest rate, noting
that for many years the interest rate was 11 percent, which was
generally understood to be a very high rate and led to some very
high compound interest calculations if years took place. Senate
Bill 21 made a change to this section that created an (A) and a
(B) with applicability tied to the time. The higher interest
rate of 11 percent is in place for before January 1, 2014, and
the lower interest rate of 3 percent above the Federal Discount
Rate is in place for the time after January 1, 2014.
1:13:44 PM
MR. ALPER explained there are three changes in Section 7. One
is a flat repeal of the language that refers to the time before
2014 because it's obsolete and no longer needed. Several pieces
of that are seen in the bill because [the administration] is
trying to get rid of obsolete statute and shrink the statute
books by a few pages. If any issue ever comes up referring to
those time periods, the statute books that were law at the time
are used and nothing is compromised or lost, it's just a matter
of getting less words in the law books.
MR. ALPER said the second change in Section 7 reinstitutes the
idea of compound interest. For most of history, when there was
a delinquency or a tax owed there is the basic amount that's
owed and then, as interest is accrued every quarter, the
interest would be added to the balance; then new interest would
be calculated on the balance plus the interest. That's the
general idea of compounding, but it was lost in a late amendment
to Senate Bill 21 and there are different opinions as to the
reason for that. He offered his belief that most people think
it was inadvertent when a technical amendment occurred in
committee that was addressing a different topic. So, the idea
of compound interest is reinstituted by HB 247.
MR. ALPER noted that third and most material in Section 7 is the
change to the interest rate itself. Instead of being tied to 3
percent over the discount rate, it would be 7 percent above the
discount rate. The discount rate today is 1 percent and is a
quarterly adjusted formula the way the state treats it. Today
the state is collecting 4 percent interest and under HB 247 the
state would collect 8 percent. The number 8 is splitting the
difference between what was too high and what is now generally
considered as too low. Continuing, he pointed out that there is
some expectation during this time of shortfall that Alaska will
be, to a certain extent, using earnings on its savings to help
fund ongoing government operations. If that occurs, that means
that there is suddenly an opportunity cost to use of the state's
savings. If an extra dollar has to be pulled out because
someone didn't pay their taxes for three years, then when that
dollar is repaid to the state's savings [the administration]
wants to ensure that [the state] gets the amount that that money
would have earned had it remained in savings. Thus, HB 247
would tie the state's interest rate approximately to the
expected rate of return for the permanent fund and that number
is in the 7 or so percent range according to the permanent
fund's consultants, Callan Associates.
1:16:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER said Mr. Alper made a lot of statements he
doesn't necessarily agree with, particularly that the Callan
discount rate is the appropriate rate for the state's cost of
capital. He requested clarification in regard to when an
assessment is made and the state charges interest as to whether
that interest commences on the date the assessment is made or on
the date that the original tax was obligated.
MR. ALPER responded that the interest begins accruing on the
date the tax was due.
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER inquired as to how many years the state is
delinquent in its audit process.
MR. ALPER answered that he doesn't want to use the word
delinquent. He allowed [the Tax Division] does have a delay,
that it does have a multi-year process to audit oil and gas
production tax returns. The statutes provide six years as the
statute of limitations. In prior years [the division] has
pushed fairly close, weeks and even days, to that six-year
deadline, but [the division] is moving off of that deadline.
The short answer is that [the Tax Division] can be up to six
years behind and [the division] is currently finishing calendar
year 2009. Those taxes were due and payable and finalized
through the true-up process on March 31, 2010, so sometime
between now and March 31 [the division] will be completing the
rest of 2009 and issuing the appropriate assessments.
1:17:51 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER recalled it was established very clearly
at the last hearing that the motivation behind HB 247 was
strictly to raise revenue; that that was the criteria as to how
the decisions that were brought forward to the committee were
established. He asked whether any consideration was given to
what is a fair assessment rate and process, or whether it was
done blindly to raise revenue. Maintaining that [the division]
is delinquent in its audits and knows it can go back, he said a
compounded interest rate over six years is now being proposed
when a taxpayer doesn't even know what its obligation is. He
recounted Mr. Alper's statement that many of these obligations
are unresolved because the department didn't have the rules and
regulations out there for the taxpayers to even know what they
could expect out of audits. He offered his belief that that had
a lot to do with why the compounding factor was eliminated as
the last bill went through the legislature. Rather than being
attributed to an error as stated by Mr. Alper, Representative
Hawker said he thinks it was a judgement that was made to
provide a more fair tax structure. He asked whether he is wrong
in thinking this.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK replied that the idea behind going to
compounding interest at a 7 percent rate was simply to make it
revenue neutral to the state, regardless of whether [the state]
refunded money or collected money on an audit. Totally revenue
neutral such that if the state had it in advance, and had it
invested, the state would get about that rate of return; if it
was owed to the state then the state should have been allowed
that rate of return. If the state owed it back, the state would
not be paying back any more than the state would have earned by
having it. The idea is not to raise more money, but simply to
make it revenue neutral given the state is moving into an era
where its investment returns are going to be a source of funding
government services. It wasn't wanted to be more or less, but
about the same.
MR. ALPER clarified that these [proposed] interest rates are in
no way retroactive. The interest rate that is in statute at the
time covers the entirety of that time period. The only taxpayer
that might be paying this new interest rate for six years is a
taxpayer that owes taxes this year and might get audited six
years from now. He said [DOR] does not want that taxpayer to be
waiting six years and is working diligently to speed up that
process and hopes to be within three or four years at most of
the due date. For example, when last year's taxes were assessed
in 2015, four and a half or five years of interest was in at the
11 percent rate and the last year or so was in at the lower
Senate Bill 21 interest rate. The lower interest rate is
working its way through the system and is becoming a larger and
larger portion of any assessment until finally it becomes the
main one or it is changed to the rate proposed in HB 247. The
money received from a tax assessment goes to the Constitutional
Budget Reserve (CBR); not much, if any, is general fund revenue.
There is no general fund revenue impact in [DOR's] fiscal note
related to this specific section of the bill.
1:21:43 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER addressed the statement that the
opportunity cost for this money is not having it in the
Constitutional Budget Reserve (CBR) fund. In regard to the idea
that it be revenue neutral to the state without having that
money in the state's accounts, he inquired as to what are the
current earnings on Constitutional Budget Reserve funds.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK responded that the earnings will be
negative this year, although not as negative as the permanent
fund. That was done because of the situation where [the state]
is spending heavily from the Constitutional Budget Reserve to
fund government. If and when [the state] has a fiscal plan that
starts using the earnings reserve of the permanent fund, then
that money in the Constitutional Budget Reserve will be put back
into the subaccount and will be invested in a fashion very
similar to the permanent fund. This all fits into the totality
of the fiscal plan and makes it consistent.
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER thanked the commissioner for the insight
he just provided.
1:22:56 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON requested Mr. Alper to repeat what he
said about interest owed in the event of an overpayment.
MR. ALPER answered that if there is an overpayment, or if there
is an assessment that is paid and then appealed, and it goes
through the process and the taxpayer wins its appeal, or settles
at some in-between point, and [DOR] owes the taxpayer a refund,
[DOR] will pay the refund with the same interest rate that [DOR]
receives on the taxpayer's underpayments to [the agency]. It's
a two-way interest rate that is throughout the statutes.
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON surmised that if HB 247 were to become
law, the State of Alaska is taking some additional risk because
in the event of an overpayment the state would pay [an interest
rate of] 7 or 8 percent rather than 3 or 4 percent.
MR. ALPER replied yes. He noted that, anecdotally from his
staff's observation in the last year or so, in past years when
there was an assessment [DOR] would be more likely to get the
payment and then have it appealed because companies didn't want
to be on the hook for that 11 percent for the year or two it
might take to work through the appeals process. The tendency
now, if a company is going to appeal, is to not pay and withhold
the money until it works through the appeals process because the
3 or 4 percent is much less onerous to the company's cash flow,
the company is better off keeping the money in its own books
until the issue is resolved.
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON inquired whether 7 percent plus the
discount rate represents a sweet spot where the best auditors of
both parties better be in their "A games" because there is an
equal liability potential for both parties to get it wrong.
MR. ALPER responded that the oil companies are all different
from each other. Each has its own expectation of return on its
own investment; legislative committees have used the term
"hurdle rate" for this expectation. The oil companies' numbers
tend to be higher than that, the state's numbers tend to be
lower because the state's money is in more conservative assets.
The intent is to tie the interest rate to the opportunity cost
based on the state's investment earnings; a metric was chosen in
HB 247 that roughly approximated that. That could be obtained
in several different ways, but the goal is try to get something
like the money that the state would otherwise be earning if that
money weren't being spent out of savings and was in the
permanent fund.
1:25:44 PM
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON asked if the most completed year is 2008.
MR. ALPER answered yes.
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON inquired whether it was the state or the
producers that got favored in the assessment when a look is
taken back 10 years ago.
MR. ALPER said he doesn't understand the question.
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON, in regard to looking at assessments for 10
years ago, asked whether the state collected additional monies
or whether the producers got money back.
MR. ALPER replied that although it is by no means universal,
when there is a change in oil and gas tax return it is almost
always in the state's favor, the state is looking for more
money.
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON, in regard to those 10 years, inquired as
to how many of them went almost to the statute of limitations.
MR. ALPER answered that the statute of limitations was increased
in 2007 with the passage of Alaska's Clear and Equitable Share
(ACES). After the passage of the earlier net profits tax in
2006, the production profits tax (PPT), it was recognized that
the work load of auditing tax returns suddenly got much more
complicated because [the Tax Division] was dealing with upstream
expenditures, a type of industry work that it had never before
looked at as far as the line-item detail. So, the struggle to
get the PPT audit on time was seen years in advance and extra
time was given for ACES. That, and the regulatory changes, and
various statutory changes, meant that the division pushed fairly
close to the line for 2007 and 2008. He offered his belief that
the division's prior history was not like that, but that in the
last two years the division was very close to statute.
1:27:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON offered his understanding that [the Tax
Division] cut its number of tax auditors from four to three.
MR. ALPER noted that Representative Olson is referring to the
audit masters. He explained that audit master is an exempt job
classification that was added as part of the ACES bill in 2007.
The audit masters are designed to be industry experienced people
who come in at a higher rate of pay so that they can provide
expertise, guidance, regulatory assistance, and supervision to a
certain extent. Under ACES, House Bill 2001, audit masters are
expressly prohibited from doing the auditing themselves, so
audit masters are helping the auditors but not doing the audits.
The actual audit staff has not been changed in the last couple
years.
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON inquired whether it would be to everybody's
advantage to take the statute of limitations back to three years
so the State of Alaska could recapture that money more quickly
than having it sit out there for six years.
MR. ALPER replied that if that were to happen immediately it
might cause [the Tax Division] to do inadequate work to go
through the next couple of years of taxes because the division
would already be past that statute for 2010 and 2011. If there
is a goal to reduce that number over the next several years, the
division intends to catch up to it. The division is starting to
do two years at a time; by a year from now the division will be
a year off the statute of limitations, by two years from now the
division will be two years off the statute of limitations, but
these things cannot happen instantaneously. [The Tax Division]
would be happy to provide some of the source documents, but the
upstream information provided by the major oil and gas companies
is hundreds of thousands of line items. It's a massive
information undertaking with a lot of back and forth, requests
for follow-up information, and examining of records. It's a
very technical and complex process. He said he would be
reluctant to say the division could speed it up faster than the
division is saying it is speeding it up.
1:29:37 PM
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON asked whether extending the effective date
two years would be an option in order to give [the Tax Division]
two years to do it.
MR. ALPER responded that two years to catch up three years is
probably more than the division could handle; the division likes
the idea of having a little bit of cushion. What if something
happens? What if a key employee is lost? What if there is
another statutory change between now and then? He said he likes
having the six years and that for as long as he has this job it
is his intent to not use it. He strongly recommended that, if
it is wanted to go in that direction, that the conversation
about changing the statute of limitations be had in a year or so
when it can be seen how well the division has followed through
on its mission to catch up some.
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON commented that everybody can be replaced,
including in the legislature. He said he does not believe [the
Tax Division] has one key person who would slow things down for
more than several months.
1:30:46 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR understood that with the PPT and ACES the
changes became more complicated in terms of figuring things out.
She inquired whether there would be a way of separating just
that to get through the 2012 tax years, such as contracting with
a company or hiring additional staff to get through those more
quickly.
MR. ALPER answered he is not certain that more staff would speed
it up because generally speaking there is typically a team of
three people working on each major producer, to limit the
conversation to that because that's where the money has been.
Each team has a senior auditor and two junior auditors. They
work closely under the direction of the supervisor of the group
who is a classified staff member, and the audit master provides
technical assistance, review work, and amendments to the
narrative. So, he said, he doesn't know if more bodies would
speed that up. While there's a lot of work to go through, a lot
of the time is spent in simply the back and forth and the trying
to convey to the taxpayer the type of information that [the Tax
Division] needs and then waiting for it to be submitted. The
division is behind not because it takes six years to do an
audit, it takes a year, but because years went by in the past
where the division wasn't finishing audits because of external
factors; for example, the initial writing of regulations after
major tax changes consumes a lot of time. A major consumer of
time was the implementation of the software system, the tax
handling system. He reiterated that he strongly believes the
division is past all of those hurdles and delay elements, and
staff are now simply doing their jobs. He offered his hope that
as the division gets more years behind it of a complex net
profits system, that the issues where the division disagrees
with industry start working themselves out and the returns come
closer to getting it right the first time.
1:33:15 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR asked whether the proposed changes in HB 247
would simplify the process, once past ACES, and make it easier
to do the assessments and do them in a shorter timeline.
MR. ALPER replied yes, adding that he thinks division staff are
getting better at their jobs. He explained that a commingling
of the two halves of the production audit group is being seen.
One discreet group of staff primarily deals with audit and tax
returns, and the other group primarily deals with auditing and
reviewing requests for refundable credits, which have different
timelines and tend to be smaller dollar items. The staff
dealing with the credit data set have become the division's in-
house experts on upstream expenditures because people are coming
in with Operating Loss Credits or Capital Credits and staff are
now working with the production tax people to help those people
develop the expertise because they need to develop that for the
tax returns going forward. So, there is a little bit of a
streamlining, but he doesn't know what that's going to look like
in two years - like all operations it's a work in progress. He
related that the other day he told [DOR's] budget subcommittee
that there are 15 fewer employees in the Tax Division than there
were 14 months ago when the administration came in. Thus far
the production audit group has not lost any positions and [the
division] is trying to keep that together because they have a
very important job to do; [the division] is close to six years
behind and it must be ensured that no deadlines are missed.
1:35:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER recalled the old adage that if it's in the
yellow pages then why have the state do it. He said he is
therefore sincerely asking why keep and build an in-house
auditing capacity when the work could be outsourced to a highly
competent industry.
MR. ALPER responded that that is outside the scope of HB 247.
He said he personally hasn't addressed that issue in the 14
months he's been doing this job, but cost estimates and
theorizing can be undertaken if it is requested and he will get
back to the appropriate committee at the appropriate time.
1:36:46 PM
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON inquired as to how much of the $235 million
in 2008 was compound interest.
MR. ALPER answered that the total assessments in 2008 were $265
million, of which about $115 million was interest. Only a small
fraction of that was compounded, but a lot of it was interest,
and $150 million was the taxes themselves. About half of that
has been paid and the books are closed and about half of that is
currently in the appeals process.
1:37:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SEATON said it seems what is really being looked
at is that the state is asking the oil companies that are
submitting tax forms whether they would like to get a 4 percent
non-compounded loan by maximizing all potential deductions that
they could possibly achieve, and over a long period of time this
is a great interest rate that anyone would like. He asked
whether the concern is that the state is giving an incentive to
people to absolutely maximize their deductions, not
fraudulently, but deductions that they could possibly obtain
knowing that if it comes back they will owe money and they will
have had a much lower interest rate loan than they could
possibly have gotten any other way. So, he surmised, the State
of Alaska ends up subsidizing to that maximum amount, although
he realizes this is a policy question.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK replied that that could possibly be
occurring, but he doesn't place on industry that that would be
the motivating factor for what they do as far as maximizing the
deductions. Companies claim what they think they are eligible
to claim, and then there are disputes as [DOR] goes through the
audits on whether some of those were actually deductible. He
isn't looking at this so much as an issue of an opportunity cost
for claiming more than may be appropriate, he simply thinks that
the rate the state is charging is not commensurate with the loss
of revenue that the state has experienced by taxes not being
paid. It is not to make a profit or a loss, but rather to make
it revenue neutral.
1:40:03 PM
MR. ALPER resumed his sectional analysis, explaining that
Section 8 is the confidentiality waiver specific to the state's
paying of credits. The language in HB 247 states, "The name of
each person claiming a credit ..., the aggregate amount of
credits ..., and a description of the taxpayer's activities that
generated the credits claimed are public information." There
are some limitations on that, he said, but the key point is if
state dollars, public money, is being spent for the purpose of
subsidizing or providing a benefit to a company, that is
information that should be able to be shared with the
legislature and with the general public so people can understand
where their money is going. [The state] has a general sunshine-
law-type requirement to put its expenditures on the internet,
the state's checkbook is available. The public can find out how
much the State of Alaska paid for chairs, airplane tickets,
office supplies, or consulting services. [The Department of
Revenue] cannot tell the public how much it paid to any of these
companies in oil and gas tax credits. He said he wants to be
very clear that [DOR] does know, but will not and cannot report,
how much money companies make, how much they pay in taxes, or
how profitable they are because that is absolutely taxpayer
confidential information. No linkage or loopholes are being
sought to be able to report that information. In fact, that is
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) protected information and
attempting to do so would put the State of Alaska in big trouble
with the federal government; the ability to share certain
information with the IRS would suddenly cease, the IRS would no
longer trust the State of Alaska. [The administration] merely
wants to be able to report where public money is being expended
for the purposes of providing subsidies and benefits to oil
companies.
1:41:58 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER recalled that in previous testimony it was
stated that HB 247 was designed to raise revenue. He asked how
this provision would raise revenue.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK responded that this particular piece will
not raise revenue, is not revenue generating itself. But, it
will allow [DOR] to have a more open discussion on these issues
around the revenue associated with this particular component.
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER inquired whether any analysis has been
done or any consideration given as to whether this provision
could result in a taxpayer's competitiveness being compromised.
A taxpayer is very different than the State of Alaska buying
chairs for this committee room, he admonished, and added that he
is offended by the analogy. He said [the State of Alaska] has
an obligation under the federal Internal Revenue Code to protect
taxpayer information which is deemed as confidential and
private. "We've probably found a point here where we can push
that limit, we can push beyond it, and disclose particular
taxpayer information," he said. He further asked whether he can
be given an assurance that the provision will not compromise the
individual competitiveness of the state's taxpayers.
MR. ALPER replied:
We have spoken to our own counsel at the Department of
Law about the degree to which this provision might
expose us to being forced to, or able to, disclose the
other information I described earlier ... the earning
specific, the tax paying specific, and were assured
that there was no potential linkage there. The
activities described in Section 8 of the bill are
somewhat aggregated in nature. ... Company X received
$10 million last year for drilling a well in the X
unit. ... I'm not providing information about their
vendors, about their cost of capital, about their
labor practices. It's very high level information,
summary level information that I have a hard time
envisioning ... rising to the level of being an
imposition on someone's competitiveness with their
fellow players in the oil field.
1:45:03 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER inquired whether Mr. Alper is an expert in
what he is envisioning. He posed a scenario in which Company X
owns leases all across the North Slope and has specifically
invested in a particular project in a particular part of the
basin. He asserted that providing the information [allowed by
Section 8] could disclose the prospectivity and stratigraphic
information belonging to Company X, and would literally point
everybody else in the world to where Company X is making a play
and result in another company bidding higher on a lease sale to
take away land that Company X may have developed information on.
The competitive advantage that a company gets by investing its
money, and for which the legislature provided an incentive,
would be compromised. He said he wants to respect the taxpayers
and wants to give them the advantage that when they make an
investment in Alaska they are given the greatest advantage
possible for having made that investment.
MR. ALPER answered that Representative Hawker is right. There
is a philosophical issue and people can disagree, so he said he
doesn't want to continue debating the specifics of this idea.
He pointed out that it is known where people are drilling
because people get drilling permits and that is available.
Plans of development are on the internet. Many of the existing
credits that DNR authorizes, the exploration credits, come with
the requirement for seismic, stratigraphic, downhole data. It
is not unusual for a certain amount of that information to be
made public. The only thing being looked here is to talk about
dollars. Compared to some of this other information, the mere
fact that someone is drilling a well in this part of the state
is already known. All that this additional increment of
information is going to let people know is approximately how
much a company spent "if you could reverse engineer that from
how much of a state credit benefit they got."
1:47:23 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON asked why the administration has at this
time decided to insert this into a bill. He further asked
whether previous administrations have attempted this before the
legislature.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK responded:
The issue of more transparency came up when we tried
to actually have any kind of discussions on credits
and found that we simply couldn't provide the
information that people were asking, a lot of people
from this particular body that when we wanted to
discuss this issue of credits and whether we thought
there needed to be some adjustments made. And people
were greatly frustrated by the fact that we could not
give them granular enough information for them to even
remotely make a decision. And so part of that was
driven just by the fact that in order to have open
transparent decisions some of this information, which
we feel quite frankly is not confidential, should be
available for that. The second part of the question,
I don't know whether it's been attempted before or
not.
MR. ALPER offered his belief that this has not been attempted
before. Tax credits as an idea, as a concept, have increasingly
become a high profile issue with the general public, including
in op-ed pieces and blog comments. He said he thinks those
conversations would be better informed if people had more
complete information and more understanding of what is being
talked about regarding what sorts of activities the State of
Alaska is benefitting, is subsidizing with these programs.
1:49:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON said he takes Mr. Alper's point
regarding the information that is publically available about
drilling, permits, and plans of development. For example, last
fall during a resources development conference that he attended
there was a major lease sale happening further down the hall.
Most companies are eager to report their successes, he said, and
his assumption is that they do that for a show of confidence in
the shareholder or the Alaska people.
MR. ALPER responded that Representative Hawker is right that
companies don't like to share their results. If a company
drills a well, [DOR] is going to be able to say how much the
company spent on that well. [The department] is not going to
tell anyone that the company found oil, and that's where the
competitive advantage as to who's going to try to lease the lot
next to them is going to come from.
1:50:38 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SEATON noted that in Cook Inlet there were a
number of players, some of whom went bankrupt. The State of
Alaska was expending a tremendous amount of money but
[legislators] couldn't find out how much. A company might say
in the newspaper that it was using tax credits and that it had
received $50 million in financing, yet [legislators] couldn't
find out how much [the State of Alaska] was investing in a
particular company because it was confidential information when
coming from [the state's] own sources. He said he thinks it is
imperative that [legislators] be able to tell [constituents]
what [the state] is investing in and if [the state] is investing
an amount of money in certain companies and certain areas. He
inquired whether there is anything in Section 8 that does
anything other than giving the state the ability to say how much
tax credits were given to a particular company.
MR. ALPER answered that Section 8 is somewhat broad, although it
primarily will enable the state to report refundable tax credits
which are truly an expenditure of the state, and, he would
posit, is not the same as saying a change to tax. There are
circumstances where credits used against tax liability would
fall under this definition. The specific exclusion of AS
43.55.024(j) on page 4, line 27, of the bill is reference to the
Per-Taxable-Barrel Credit, the sliding scale per-barrel credit
on the North Slope. The thought there is that if the amount of
per-barrel credits a company got is reported, and it is already
known how much production a company has because that's public
information, someone could reverse engineer the company's sales
price. So that is something [DOR] wants to be able to protect.
But, other credits against liability would be similarly reported
the way the section is written now, for example the $5-a-barrel
credit from new oil or the Small Producer Credit.
1:53:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR recalled that in 2013 Senator Gardner had a
bill about disclosing this information; she received interest
from her neighbors that they were interested in being able to
receive this information. Representative Tarr noted that one
thing that has been talked about is trying to understand better
whether the credits are having the intended effect on
exploration and development activities and therefore she sees
this provision as perhaps helping [legislators] getting closer
to answering those questions too. She requested Mr. Alper to
comment on how this provision might help [legislators] better
understand whether they are doing the right thing, whether the
tool that was used is getting the result that was wanted. For
example, one of the criticisms of ACES was that the credits
weren't linked to production. It seems that this provision
might be one way to get a little more of that information.
MR. ALPER replied that in response to previous testimony, he and
the commissioner have been talking to staff at DOR and will come
back to the committee with a much more detailed explanation and
granular modeling as to some of the bill's impacts and how they
might impact a theoretical or particular project. If [DOR] was
able to talk with more precision about actual things that had
occurred, or were going to occur, it would be much easier to
tell this story; but that is a story that [DOR] is not able to
tell under the law the way it is currently written.
1:55:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER said he appreciates the word about reverse
engineering because that's what analysis of this information
would do, and would potentially compromise the proprietary trade
information of any given company. With disclosure of a cost-
based credit, someone can reverse and extrapolate the amount of
expenditure that was required to generate that credit.
Expenditure levels, investment levels, are pretty proprietary
information when they are looked at in terms of individual
prospects that would arguably be disclosed here. That's the
thing to keep in mind when demanding this information. While
sitting here and making laws it would be nice to have all that
individual taxpayer information, but [legislators] have to
accept that some things just can't be had out of respect for
both federal law and that competitive advantage. The ability to
reverse engineer cost credits would expose companies to having a
great deal of their proprietary information, cost efficiency,
and capital allocations divulged. In that these are all credits
under AS 43.55, he asked whether that would also include the Net
Operating Loss Credit carry forward.
MR. ALPER responded yes, Section 8 as written would require that
[DOR] divulge the size of an Operating Loss Credit.
1:57:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER maintained that this divulges a taxpayer's
most critical information, their taxable level, which is exactly
what the federal government doesn't want [the state] to do to an
individual taxpayer. He said he disagrees with the attorney
generals at the Department of Law if they say that this is okay.
MR. ALPER answered that, in the broader concept, there is a
dissonance in priority between what is seen to be the state's
benefit to divulge certain information and industry's need to
keep something secretive. [The administration] would like to
find language that is acceptable to all parties as HB 247 moves
forward. An excellent point is made by Representative Hawker.
In some ways, limiting this type of disclosure to just cash
credits where companies are receiving an appropriation of state
funds might be something a little narrower and a little bit less
challengeable as proprietary accounting information. The
Operating Loss Credit is an interesting point to raise because
it relates back to a company's profits and losses. Noting that
[committee members] understand [the administration's] intent in
proposing this section, he said the administration looks forward
to working with members on this very complex area of law to try
to find language acceptable to everybody.
1:58:43 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR surmised that in looking at operating loss
it might depend on the size of the company because, in terms of
the big three, some don't do separate accounting so their Alaska
operations aren't separated from their worldwide operations.
Thus, she concluded, the State of Alaska would just get the
aggregate information relative to the whole company and it would
be just the portion of credits that were Alaska development.
MR. ALPER replied that that's not quite right. The type of
accounting by aggregation and apportionment is relative to
Alaska's corporate income tax structure. The oil and gas
production tax is quite discreet in its Alaska-specific revenues
and expenditures. Existing law has a lot of restrictive
language regarding what is an allowable deduction - they are
spending the money but they don't get to count it, a classic
example being lobbying expenditures. When switching to a net
profits tax, the legislature chose to specifically exclude
lobbying expenses, so those dollars are not deductible from
production tax.
2:00:08 PM
MR. ALPER resumed to his sectional analysis, noting that
Sections 9, 10, and 11 are conforming language. He explained
that these are three of the credits that were built into the
corporate income tax statutes added by different pieces of law
in three different time periods. Section 9 refers to the Cook
Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska (CINGSA) facility. The 2010
Cook Inlet Recovery Act provided a credit to build the gas
storage facility located in Kenai. Section 10 refers to the
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Storage Facility Credit written
primarily around the Interior gas utility in Fairbanks but also
available to other bulk storage tanks for LNG that might be
built elsewhere in the state. Section 11 is the In-State
Refinery Tax Credit, the most recent credit that was added in
2014. These three credits are not being changed in any way.
However, these credits contain language that says if a company
owes any kind of tax to the state - whether production,
property, cigarette, or another kind of tax - that could be
withheld before they get paid their credits. The change being
made in these sections would broaden that by deleting the
sentence that says for unpaid delinquent taxes and to instead
say outstanding liability. So, with this change, if a company
owes something that is not part of the tax code, such as a
royalty or a lease payment to the Department of Natural
Resources, that also could be offset against a credit payment
before the state pays the credit. Thus, the structure in
Sections 9, 10, and 11 remains identical, it is just simply
broadening that ability to withhold funds for other obligations
to the state.
2:01:56 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON recounted that the Alaska Oil and Gas
Association (AOGA) expressed some concern that this section is
sort of an overreach, that there could be some de minimis fee or
tax that's owed and it would hold up the process of receipt of
the credit. He inquired whether Mr. Alper thinks there is any
merit to that and is more alarmist than Mr. Alper would view it.
MR. ALPER responded he doesn't want to use the word alarmist.
If the issue itself is de minimis, then the [amount of] withhold
would be de minimis. If someone is fighting over a $500 fine
somewhere, then only $500 would be held back from the credit.
It is not that the entire credit gets stopped in its tracks over
the dispute, it's that the amount of the dispute is held
essentially in escrow. This specific issue has happened within
the last year - someone who was seeking a credit owed money to
other state agencies.
2:03:03 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER said he understands and appreciates the
intent being made here, which is to protect the State of Alaska
against someone who is going to take advantage of the tax
structure to get funds back from the state when in fact they
really ought to be paying the state. However, he argued, this
is horribly unartful language. Speaking as a former certified
public accountant (CPA) who also did tax returns, he said that
if a claimant has any liability to the state "you can basically
withhold anything." He pointed out that a taxpayer accrues a
liability to the state every single day of operation. For
example, these companies have millions of dollars of payroll in
the state and every time they write a payroll check they have a
liability to the state to transmit those funds that were
withheld from payroll checks. The whole point of the language
that HB 247 would delete is that it is wanted to withhold
payments to companies that have unpaid delinquent tax. That was
there so the state didn't cross that line of the universal
definition of liability. Funds that a company owes from a
payroll check, he said, could very well be used here to
completely eliminate, shut down entirely, a refundable tax
credit program. Saying he respects the desire to tighten this
up, he requested that [the administration] go back to the
drawing board to find a way to not cast such a broad net.
MR. ALPER offered his appreciation for Representative Hawker's
suggestion. He noted that he previously spoke to the intent,
which is that only the amount of any liability would potentially
be withheld from a credit. He pointed out that a definition of
outstanding liability to the state is included in Section 39 of
the bill because a new concept is being created. It used to say
an outstanding liability to the state for delinquent taxes.
Section 39 states that "outstanding liability to the state"
means "an amount of tax, interest, penalty, fee, rental,
royalty, or other charge for which the state has issued a demand
for payment that has not been paid when due and, if contested,
has not been finally resolved against the state." He offered to
work with the committee to further refine that, but said he
believes this resolves a lot of the potential issues that
Representative Hawker raised.
2:06:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER reiterated that the way this language is
written, a taxpayer assessed a fee and pursuing a legitimate
remedy to challenge the state's assessment could be shut down
completely with receiving any funds from the state while the
taxpayer is, in good faith, contesting an assessment, and that
assessment could be a payroll tax assessment or anything else.
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON, regarding Representative Hawker's point,
asked whether this is for non-tax liabilities as well.
MR. ALPER answered yes, [the state] has current ability to
withhold [credits] for any tax liability. The intent is to
broaden that for other liabilities to the state, with the most
prominent ones being royalties, lease payments, AOGCC fines, and
those kind of things that are relevant to the oil and gas
industry. Per Section 39, there has to have been an assessment,
a demand for payment, and then a non-payment on that demand for
it to trigger the condition.
2:07:42 PM
MR. ALPER continued to his sectional analysis, pointing out that
Section 12 is very much a material section. He explained that
AS 43.55.011(f) is the so-called floor provision of current law,
the minimum tax for production from the North Slope. As
currently written it is a step-down tax. Colloquially, most
people think of it as a 4 percent floor, but in fact that's only
true if the price of oil for the last year has averaged greater
than $25 and thankfully for modern history that has been the
reality. But, should the price of oil drop between $20 and $25
the floor goes to 3 percent; between a price of $17.50 and $20,
if he has that right, the floor goes to 2 percent and steps down
from there. All of that would be repealed and reenacted. He
commented he is always uncomfortable with a repeal and reenact,
but because of all that stepdown language it was, for drafting
simplicity, easier. The bill would replace all of that with a 5
percent minimum tax, and that is 5 percent of the gross value at
the point of production. The underlying tax is a net profits
tax, or a tax on a calculation called production tax value,
which is an analog for net profits. When that number adjusted
for certain credits is less than a number that equals 4 percent
of gross revenue, then the larger gross revenue figure is paid,
an alternative minimum tax. Section 12 increases that by 25
percent, from 4 percent to 5 percent.
2:09:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER recalled DOR's earlier statement that the
committee will be provided with some granular analysis of the
consequence of the provisions in HB 247. He said this provision
is significant and effectively increases taxes on companies that
are today losing money in the state of Alaska. He would like to
know truly what the consequence is going to be on industry in a
financial perspective as well as the macroeconomics on what this
is really going to do to the state's competitiveness and ability
to continue to attract investment capital. This is not just a
simple credit change, it's not a simple repeal and reenact; it
is a very material provision, so he is looking for very explicit
analysis of what the consequences of this provision will be on
Alaska's international competitiveness.
MR. ALPER replied that [the administration] absolutely intends
to go to that level of detail with a quantitative presentation
that is being prepared for the next time the committee hears
[the administration] on the bill, whenever that might be.
2:10:42 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON asked whether this is the provision
that might generate $50 million in additional revenue to the
State of Alaska.
MR. ALPER responded yes, provided that the price of oil in the
given fiscal year in the fiscal note is below the amount to
where it is out of the minimum tax and into the underlying
production tax. For the foreseeable future, per the Department
of Revenue's forecast, the price of oil is expected to stay
below approximately $85 a barrel price, which is the threshold
for the minimum tax. So, about $50 million a year of revenue is
tied to the change in Section 12.
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON, relative to Representative Hawker's
question, the importance of which he respects, inquired whether
at some fundamental level the question might be what the loss of
$50 million in profit at a certain barrel price does to Alaska's
competitiveness vis-a-vis other worldwide markets. He further
inquired whether it is that simple at some basic level and
whether such a thing could possibly be analyzed.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK answered that in its [2015] report the Oil
and Gas Competitiveness Review Board looked at some of the tax
rates in the regimes the board thought would be competitive. It
didn't go to Saudi Arabia, but rather to Kansas, Wyoming, Texas,
and Canada, places that would directly compete in the market for
that. He said that information will be brought forward.
2:12:41 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON asked when the Alaska Oil and Gas
Competitiveness Review Board last met.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK replied it has been more than six months.
Because of the downturn in the market several of the people
resigned from the board because they needed to focus on their
own business, and the board hasn't been put back together.
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON inquired whether the governor has re-
appointed people to that board.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK responded that the last conversation he
had with the governor's office was that some people were being
considering and more names were being looked for. Getting the
board back up and running has been a struggle. The next report
from the Alaska Oil and Gas Competitiveness Review Board isn't
due until January 2017, but the board took on a more aggressive
agenda than what was dictated in the statutes. One of the
reports the board was trying to achieve this year was a
competitiveness review but one of the primary people involved in
that was one of the people who resigned.
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON said he thinks now would be the time for
efforts to be redoubled in getting those people appointed so
that those kind of reviews could be done. Or, he continued,
have the department take it on as a project because part of what
is being talked about here is how competitive is Alaska on a
worldwide and nationwide basis. He said he would like to see
these appointees at the next round of confirmations if
confirmations are required for this board.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK answered he doesn't think those are
confirmed positions and stated that [the administration] is
working diligently trying to get the board positions filled.
2:14:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON asked how much of an increase this is
percentage-wise and why from a policy perspective it would be
wanted to tax companies that are now in a negative cash flow.
MR. ALPER replied that increasing the tax rate from 4 percent to
5 percent is a 25 percent increase. Regarding the second
question about why, he said the reason the state's tax system
includes an alternative minimum tax is to protect the state from
the potential consequences of the switch to a net profits tax.
During the era of the Economic Limit Factor (ELF) the state did
receive a minimum that was measured in cents per barrel, but the
idea during that time was that the state was getting a
percentage of gross regardless of what a company's expenses
were, regardless of whether a company was making money. The
state wasn't calculating profitability so it wasn't taxing
profitability. In an era where [the state] is allowing the
offset for operating and capital expenditures, it can get to a
circumstance where the company might be losing money, but that
means that [the state's] taxes could go below zero, a risk [the
state] didn't have during the ELF era. So this minimum tax is
there to protect the state in case of that eventuality. Once
that is accepted as a premise, then it's just a matter of what's
the appropriate level and [the administration] is positing that
the appropriate level is slightly higher than what is currently
in statute.
COMMISSIONER HOFFBECK added that part of the reason there's an
increase in all these various industries across the state is
that the governor simply said he wanted everybody to participate
in the fiscal situation that the state is facing. There was
nothing about the 5 percent except that it is a component of the
oil and gas industry contributing as well.
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON commented it is important to have these
explanations on the record.
2:16:58 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER said he thinks there was a previous
question about what is the effective tax rate as a result of
this change. He reiterated that it was previously stated that
HB 247 was to raise revenue without consideration of the
consequences on the state's competitive ability to attract
capital, to keep reinvestment going, and continue to develop a
field in its later stages, particularly Prudhoe Bay and the
North Slope, in a very developed aging field in which it is more
difficult and expensive to extract. The rate would be raised
without any real understanding of what the consequences are, he
said. It was seen what happened under ACES when taxes were
raised too far. It is important to know what the total
government take would become under this additional scenario so
legislators have some basis for evaluating the state's
continuing competitiveness. While it might be great to get
money from the industry now, where will the State of Alaska get
money in five years when production collapses again? These are
the kind of questions that members need to see answered.
2:18:17 PM
MR. ALPER resumed his sectional analysis, noting that Section 13
is very long because of the standards of statutory construction
in which the entirety of a subsection is redrafted, which in
this case is AS 43.55.020(a), regardless of the smallness or
tightness of the actual amendment. Thus, Section 13 is eight
pages of the bill, but the section only actually makes two
changes. He explained that AS 43.55.020(a) describes the
laborious process by which producers make a monthly installment
payment on their production taxes to the state. It is long
because there are separate provisions and rules for different
time periods and also different segments, such as the North
Slope, oil from Cook Inlet, gas from Cook Inlet, and oil
produced after 2022 when the gross tax on gas kicks in. Each of
these different scenarios and alternatives has its own very
complex language in AS 43.55.020. The bill would not change the
idea of a monthly installment payment, but that language does
reference in a couple of places the minimum tax and it says
"given X, Y, Z set of circumstances they pay 4 percent of the
gross" and HB 247 changes that to say "now they're going to pay
5 percent of the gross." So, there are two specific reference
points where another number is being changed to 5 [percent].
Section 13 is conforming to the change made to the minimum tax
rate in Section 12.
2:19:59 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER understood that the point being made is
long section, small change. Drawing attention to the prefacing
point of Section 13 on page 6, line 9, of the bill, he said this
whole section is basically the statute that's part of the
statement of taxes, it's the instructions for making the payment
of a tax liability to the state. He noted that line 9 states
"For a calendar year," which defines that the tax period is a
calendar year. This is a way to try to make a provision for
periodic deposits of tax throughout the year and then a true-up
at the end of the year. He recalled that [DOR] testified that
it had serious problems with a true-up at the end of a year
because this section did not capture on a ratable basis as
prescribed here all the taxes that were due by the end of the
year in full compliance with the statute. While this small
change is being made in Section 13 for the proposed change in
the minimum tax floor, he asked whether this a section that
might be looked at to find a way to do a better job of ratably
collecting the taxes that are owed, given [DOR] has stated that
this is a problem.
MR. ALPER responded he is sure that the committee will have
specific questions on the change that is in Section 17 that
Representative Hawker referred to, having to do with the true-up
and how certain credits are treated. That is an issue [DOR]
found to a specific circumstance related to the treatment of
Per-Taxable-Barrel Credits, which he will discuss at the
appropriate time. He said he personally would like to see a
simplification of this section because he finds it almost
unreadable, yet he is responsible for implementing it. He knows
what it does, he knows what it purports to do, and he has seen
it evolve over the years as various pieces of oil and gas
legislation have worked through the body. He has seen, because
of the nature of it, that it refers to a lot of things that
aren't being amended but it puts them in black in white, it
draws attention to issues that people were unaware of. It would
be great if it could be simplified. The fact that the state has
different tax regimes and different tax treatments for multiple
areas throughout the state is what makes it necessary to have
such a complicated structure to make monthly estimated tax
payments. At some point, he said, it might behoove the state to
come to a statewide more uniform structure for oil and gas
taxation and then this section could be simplified.
2:22:49 PM
MR. ALPER continued his sectional analysis, addressing Section
14. He first pointed out that within Section 13 there is a lot
of applicability language inside the oil and gas statutes that
say this subsection refers to production before 2014, or this
refers to production before 2016, or before 2011. He said AS
43.55.020(a)(1) and (2) refer exclusively to production that
takes place prior to January 1, 2014; they are remnant sections
from before the effective date of Senate Bill 21. Later in the
bill, .020(a)(1) and (2) are repealed, which will reduce the
footprint of that section and make future amendments, if
necessary, take less pages in the bill. In making those repeals
certain conforming language is needed elsewhere in law. He
reiterated he doesn't like repealed and reenacted because it
tends to make people think that something is being hidden, but
he assured committee members that all Section [14] does is
repoint existing law that talks about a technical part of
monthly installment payments and eliminates the reference (a)(1)
and (a)(2) because those are being repealed elsewhere in the
bill. He pointed out that on page 13, line 22, of the bill,
"(a)(3), (5), or (7)" are references in current law that also
talk about (a)(1) and (2).
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER asked whether it is needed to keep these
sections in statute while the audits for this period are yet
unresolved.
MR. ALPER answered "no we do not, absolutely." It is quite
clear in the history, the case law, that if there is a dispute
on a tax that took place in year X, the statutes that were in
place at the time are what govern that dispute.
2:25:12 PM
MR. ALPER reviewed Sections 15 and 16, saying they are the same
as Section 14, only they're amended rather than repealed and
reenacted. They remove references to (a)(1) and (a)(2) in other
technical sections relating to monthly installment payments.
For example, this can be seen on page 14, lines 3 and 23, of the
bill where references to (a)(1) and (2) are being eliminated.
He reiterated that (a)(1) and (2) are repealed in the repealer
section of the bill, which currently is Section 40, and they
refer only to production and monthly installment payments prior
to January 1, 2014.
2:26:04 PM
MR. ALPER pointed out that Section 17 is one of the most
material sections of the bill. He explained that AS 43.55.022
is a new section of law, as currently there is no AS 43.55.022,
and it is titled "Limitations on tax credits." It's a limit in
the applicability of certain tax credits to either reduce taxes
or be claimed. He said AS 43.55.022(a) lays the framework and
(b) and (c) make actual changes, with (b) providing that if a
company has these credits it cannot use them to reduce its
monthly installment payment below the minimum tax level. There
are complicated reference points, AS 43.55.020(a)(5)(B)(ii) and
(a)(7)(A)(ii), which are references to statute that specifically
identify the 5 percent minimum tax, or in current law the
flexible 4 through 0 percent minimum tax. It says that a
company in possession of a certain credit cannot use that credit
to reduce its monthly installment below the minimum tax level,
so it is going to require a higher monthly installment payment.
He explained that (c) says that the use of those credits over
the course of a year may not exceed the sum total of the amount
used in the 12 months of the year. While it is written more
broadly, it almost entirely refers to the Per-Taxable-Barrel
Credit. In a year where there is very high volatility, such as
the calendar year 2014 where this arose, there were months
earlier in the year where the price of oil was quite high. The
per-taxable barrel was $5 or $6, a number less than $8. The
companies were able to claim it, reduce their taxes, and pay at
some higher level. In the later months of the year as the price
started to drop, the bottom of the Per-Taxable-Barrel Credit was
reached, the $8 maximum figure. Then as prices dropped yet
further, the limitation on the use of the Per-Taxable-Barrel
Credit was seen because under current law they cannot be used to
go below the minimum tax payment, the floor stands in the way of
the use of the Per-Taxable-Barrel Credit. At the end of
calendar year 2014, DOR had 12 monthly installment payments and
thought it had its revenue for the year. As it turned out, when
the 12 months were commingled and the true-ups done, DOR owed
refunds of between $100 million and $150 million to this suite
of producers because of the ability to, in effect, migrate some
of those per-barrel credits from month to month. Because this
complicated technical concept is very hard to explain with
words, he said he will be bringing slides, examples, and
formulas to show how that has worked in practice and how it
would be corrected with the change in Section 17(c).
2:29:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER argued that this is not as difficult as
Mr. Alper is proposing it to be, but really quite simple. He
observed that page 2 of the sectional analysis regarding Section
17(c) states, "This effectively turns the per-taxable-barrel
credit into a monthly rather than an annual calculation."
Representative Hawker argued that this would significantly
change the entire premise upon which the state's whole tax
structure is designed, which is that it is an annualized
calculation rather than a monthly calculation. It would no
longer be an annual calculation, it would be purely monthly,
which is a huge and absolute complete and total change. He
suggested that it is not unlike telling an individual who has
personal income that fluctuates throughout the year that the
person must pay taxes on the one month that he got income at a
very high personal tax rate rather than on the rate that applies
on an average throughout the year under the Internal Revenue
Code. He said he is looking forward to the consequences that
[DOR] shows for this, adding that the concept of what is fair
and reasonable must be introduced into this dialogue. He
maintained that this is purely a money grab.
MR. ALPER replied there is zero impact in DOR's fiscal note from
this provision because DOR doesn't project volatility and the
issue is only relevant when there is volatility, change in price
from month to month. The material impact on the state happened
in the past. This was a $100-$150 million impact on the state
in the true-up of the calendar year 2014 taxes. He clarified
that the Per-Taxable-Barrel Credit in current law is already a
monthly calculation. It is based on the price of oil in that
month whether the per-barrel credit is $8, $7, all the way down
to $0. So, it is already reflecting fluctuations from month to
month in the gross value of the oil. What would be constrained
is the ability to take that $1, $7, or $8 and move its value,
its implication, from month to month within a tax year. "It is
an issue of policy, it's an issue where individuals are going to
disagree," he said, "and it's something that we see to be a
priority to protect the state's interests in the event of
volatility."
2:32:29 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER recalled Mr. Alper's statement that the
state cannot predict volatility, and said a taxpayer cannot
predict it either. The taxpayer would have no assurance other
than just knowing that under statute the state is going to take
away all the upside of any individual month's price fluctuation
so that all a taxpayer is left with are the bottoms of the
fluctuations. He agreed it is a policy call, but said it's one
that he is personally particularly troubled by.
MR. ALPER responded:
By no means are we taking all of the upside, we may be
taking a little bit more of it and I would even go
further and say during the ACES era when the entire
tax rate with progressivity varied from month to
month, we took a substantially larger portion of the
upside from industry than we do currently. This bill
... takes a tiny fraction of that back and only in
circumstances where there's quite low prices in
certain months of the year.
2:33:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER recalled Mr. Alper saying that this
element is not in the fiscal note. He asked whether that means
there is a much more granular analysis than what is in the
fiscal note. The fiscal note basically has one lump number that
would be put aside into a tax credit fund for the future with no
analysis. He again asked whether there is an analysis on the
components, the financial consequences, as DOR estimates them on
the various components of the bill.
MR. ALPER answered that there is an analysis of how it works in
practice in a theoretical year with high volatility. He said he
would love to be able to bring the specifics of calendar year
2014 before the committee. Because there are at least three
taxpayers and aggregated data, he needs to check with his staff
and counsel to see whether it can be shown. It is an
interesting calculation and it led to an internal discussion
among staff as to whether staff wanted to go forward with this
provision and the consensus was that it would be a good idea,
that it would be in the interest of the state, and he does want
to bring it before the committee at a level of granular detail.
The reason it's not in the fiscal note is because the fiscal
note is tied to DOR's revenue forecast, the revenue forecast is
by its nature lumpy, it has an average price of oil for each
fiscal year but it doesn't contemplate the possibility of
volatility within an individual fiscal year.
2:35:00 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON recalled Mr. Alper stating that page 15,
line 19, is a brand new section and there isn't one like it in
the statutes. He related that his staff "googled" the title,
"Limitations on tax credits," and it came up as a tax increase.
He asked why it isn't just called a tax increase given it looks
like a tax and walks like a tax.
MR. ALPER replied it is a tax increase and there is no attempt
to disguise that. This bill does two things. The majority of
the changes made by HB 247 reduce the use of credits and the
state's outlay in spending money on credits, or defer, or make
various changes related to credits. A few of the changes
increase the state's revenue in certain specific circumstances,
primarily dealing with the minimum tax, and Section 17 is one of
those categories. If a condition is met and Section 17 is
triggered, it would increase the amount of money that the state
gets from a given oil and gas producer. That is a tax increase.
Without question, it shows up on the revenue side, not the
expenditure side, of the ledger.
2:36:25 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SEATON said it seems that there is a problem with
the volatility even though it is a monthly per-barrel credit and
that's because the per-barrel credit can be different from month
to month. He inquired whether going to a $5 per-barrel tax
credit throughout, without any sliding scale, would take care of
this volatility problem.
MR. ALPER responded he is not certain and offered his belief
that it would to a large extent but not completely. With
volatility - for example, a $5 flat per-barrel credit as in the
version, say, of Senate Bill 21 that was passed by the Senate
before it came to this committee in 2013 - if there are months
with very low prices where the $5 was limited by the floor,
there might be the ability to shift some of that around. [The
department] hasn't specifically modeled it, but DOR will find
that out as part of its analysis when back before the committee.
2:37:29 PM
CO-CHAIR TALERICO suggested that the language here could be
expanded and cleaned up. While he is not saying the language is
so clever that he thinks people are being tricked, it certainly
tricks him a little bit. He said he has a question about the
structuring of the calendar year versus the monthly estimate
versus what can be done in the end in the credits and it looks
to him like anything can be done forward. Noting that although
[the state] may have promised a credit, a particular credit in
one month, he asked whether Mr. Alper can assure him that these
credits move forward at all and compile for the end of the
calendar year when these folks figure this out, or whether this
strictly limits it just to the monthly configuration.
MR. ALPER answered that the tax is an annual tax, full stop.
The credits are annual credits. Section 13 describes mechanisms
for monthly estimates that are supposed to add up to an annual
tax. What is being attempted through these sections in this
portion of the bill is to harden up some of those monthly
calculations so that the sum total of the 12 monthly
calculations more closely adds up to the annual total. Section
17 is trying to fix where if it's limited because of the minimum
tax in a month, then that month's limitation should carry
through for the rest of the year. "What we're trying to
prevent," he said, "is if there's a limitation in one month that
the company can't scoop up that limited credit by applying it
against another month's taxes." This is one of those concepts
that's very hard to explain without numbers.
CO-CHAIR TALERICO remarked that it is hard to understand without
the numbers as well.
2:39:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE OLSON said he would like to correct a statement
made by Mr. Alper that HB 247 doesn't grab as much as ACES did.
He said that, to his knowledge, the legislature didn't have a
model that went above $105 a barrel during the consideration of
ACES. What ACES captured on the top end when the price reached
$135 or $140 a barrel was certainly an unintended consequence.
He offered his belief that ACES would not have moved out of the
legislature had there been models that went up to $150 a barrel.
"The difference is you guys know what you're doing," he said.
"At that point in time that was a totally unintended
consequence, at least to, I believe, most of us in the
legislature."
MR. ALPER agreed that the legislature did not contemplate what
would happen at $140 oil, especially at the cost profile that
was had at that era, which was only $22-$25 per barrel. There
was a lot of taxable value for a few months, and with the
monthly tax calculation there were production tax rates with
progressivity in excess of 50 percent. He said the point he was
trying to make a few minutes ago was that when describing all of
the upside, or some of the upside, or most of the upside, what
is really being talked about is the marginal tax rates at that
point. If a company makes the incremental dollar, is the state
taking 80 cents of that, 20 cents of that, or somewhere in
between? The change envisioned by Section 17 does take a little
bit more of the incremental money that comes in if there are
some high months versus some low months, but it does not
approach the level of marginal tax of high percentages taken in
the high price spikes that ACES did.
2:41:29 PM
MR. ALPER resumed his sectional analysis, noting Section 18
relates to the carried-forward annual loss credit as it applies
to the Gross Value Reduction (GVR). He explained that currently
the GVR is a subtraction from taxable value before the tax is
calculated. A North Slope-only provision for "legacy" oil, oil
that is not eligible for the GVR, is that a company gets to its
net profits, gets to its production tax value, and then that is
multiplied by the tax rate, which is 35 percent for the North
Slope. Another North Slope-only provision is that if a company
has "new" oil it gets to its production tax value and then it
gets to further adjust that production tax value through the
subtraction of, for the most part, 20 percent of the gross
value. That 20 percent of the gross is subtracted from the net,
thus the term Gross Value Reduction, to come up with a reduced
modified net profits that is then multiplied by the 35 percent
tax rate. Effectively it's a tax reduction, and there are
technical reasons why the calculation was structured in that
way, having to do with the commingling of expenses from field to
field. The concept was to reduce the tax. However, [DOR]
learned what happens if a company has a loss instead of having a
profit that might be reduced by this calculation so that the
company would pay a lower tax rate. If a company has a loss
under normal circumstances for legacy oil, it would be eligible
for a Net Operating Loss Credit of a percentage of that loss.
Last year that was 45 percent. A $10 million loss with a 45
percent Net Operating Loss Credit would be a credit of $4.5
million that the state would pay out in cash to the company.
2:43:40 PM
MR. ALPER continued, explaining what happens under current law
when the oil in the aforementioned scenario is new oil, oil
that's eligible for the GVR. In that case, the $10 million loss
could be modified by a calculation based on the gross revenue
and turned into a $30 million loss. So, while the company
actually lost $10 million, the calculation of the GVR makes it
look like a $30 million loss for purposes of tax. A 45 percent
credit on a $30 million loss is $13.5 million in credit, so [the
state] is in a position of writing a credit check for $13.5
million to offset a $10 million loss, giving the company a
credit of greater than 100 percent of the amount of the loss.
It was surprising to find this circumstance allowable under law,
but according to the attorneys it was allowable under the strict
interpretation of Senate Bill 21's provisions as written. So,
[the state] has paid credits based upon that calculation.
Section 18 would not change the Gross Value Reduction in the
circumstance where the company is paying taxes, but it would
change the Gross Value Reduction if there is a loss. Section 18
says a company cannot use it to reduce the size of the operating
loss for the purposes of calculating a credit and it prevents
that circumstance where [the state] could potentially be paying
credits of greater than 100 percent of the amount of the loss.
REPRESENTATIVE SEATON offered his hope that when Mr. Alper
brings in the graphic presentation there will be some way to
explain the aforementioned a little bit easier.
2:45:17 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON said he thought he heard Mr. Alper say
this is a tax reduction, but asked whether it isn't actually a
tax increase.
MR. ALPER replied that this provision would only be relevant in
a circumstance where the taxpayer in question was in a loss. So
it would be a reduction in the state's credit spend, a reduction
in the credit offered to the company.
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON reiterated that he thought he heard Mr.
Alper say that this a tax reduction, but now Mr. Alper has
explained it is a tax increase.
MR. ALPER responded he doesn't recall saying it was a tax
reduction, and either he was misheard or he misspoke, but it was
not his intent to say that this was a tax reduction.
2:46:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE SEATON understood Section 18 is particularly
applicable to new oil.
MR. ALPER answered it is specifically and uniquely applicable to
new oil on the North Slope.
REPRESENTATIVE SEATON further understood that the problem trying
to be avoided is where [the state] would pay more than the total
expense of a project because it's all a net loss if there isn't
production. So, he surmised, with the vagaries of the law as
written, [the state] could actually be providing the company
more than 100 percent of its total costs which generate a loss.
MR. ALPER replied that is not precisely correct because it is
not 100 percent of the company's costs. This provision is only
relevant if the company in question has production, if the
company has some sort of sale, some sort of gross revenue that
the company is producing oil, but in doing so the company is
operating at a loss. That circumstance would occur in very low
prices or would sometimes occur with a new field where a company
is producing from the early wells but still building out the
field and drilling subsequent wells and the company continues to
operate at a loss for some years before the field is complete.
If there is a loss, the company has revenue minus expenses that
leads to a negative number. The way the Net Operating Loss
Credit works in that circumstance is the credit is tied to the
net loss, the revenue minus expenses. What is trying to be done
in Section 18 is to prevent the credit itself from being larger
than the amount of the entirety of the loss.
2:48:14 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR inquired whether, to date, that circumstance
has occurred.
MR. ALPER responded he doesn't want to go into details because
of confidentiality, but said there have been a couple of
specific credit applications since he became director of the Tax
Division where he actually questioned the calculation and kicked
it back to the auditor saying that it couldn't be right. But in
checking with the audit masters and legal counsel, it was found
that it was the appropriate treatment under the way the law is
written - the auditor had it right and [the state] did owe that
credit.
2:48:59 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER said he is still struggling with getting
his arms around this. Regarding the effective change, he
understood it would just eliminate before January 1, 2014. He
offered his understanding that the operative language is that
any reduction under AS 43.55.160(f) or (g) is added back to the
calculation of production tax values for the calendar year and
that that is the Gross Value Reduction as applicable to new oil.
MR. ALPER clarified that this particular section is inside AS
43.55.023(b), which is the statutory section describing the
carried forward Annual Loss Credit. So, it's only in the
calculation of an Annual Loss Credit and when there is a
circumstance that might trigger the Annual Loss Credit, in other
words an annual loss, then these Gross Value Reductions would be
re-added before the credit itself is calculated.
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER commented he is still confused on this if
under .160(f) [the state] already had a provision in there that
says the GVR could not be used to reduce the gross value at the
point of production below zero. The whole mechanism there was
adjusting the tax rate, [the state] wasn't going to allow
potentially a tax rate adjustment. He said he is trying to
understand how both of those limitations apply and he is looking
forward to a far more clear explanation.
MR. ALPER answered that these are technical provisions of law.
He explained:
There are places that say production tax value can't
be less than zero ... so we're not paying taxes in
reverse," he explained. But a net operating loss
still exists even if production tax value is limited
to zero. So the limits in .160(f) prevent the
subtraction to get ... a production tax value below so
we're not paying a negative tax ... but the net
operating loss is not impacted by that. ... We're
extending that limitation also to a net operating loss
to say we can't use these reductions to increase the
size of an operating loss. An operating loss itself
is a cash flow calculation, it's tied to actual
revenue and actual allowable expenditures. That's the
basis for the Operating Loss Credit right now.
2:52:02 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HAWKER said the philosophy on this is all he can
talk at this juncture on these details. He continued:
But the point there exactly was that ... the big push
from folks was to incent the development of new areas,
again, new oil, oil that wasn't otherwise going to be
able to be brought forward. That's how we established
the GVR and, in this case, because we really wanted to
incent these new developments, these new producers ...
a very strict reading out of [Senate Bill] 21 allows,
effectively when you're doing it, carry forward net
operating loss for an industry, a player, a new
entrant ... someone who's developing new oil to, if
they are operating at a loss position, to truly get
full value for those losses into the future. And here
we're truncating that incentive that we were providing
for the development of new oil. I think that's why it
was really different than further development in old
oil. ... What is going to be our consequence? It is
going to have a chilling effect on the pursuit of new
oil, which was a very high priority for us, by
essentially taking away that opportunity, that
advantage, in a situation where somebody is getting
started, they're getting their field developed,
they're getting their initial production going, and
they have a loss and we're saying "oh ya, oh by the
way, that incentive ... we're trying to give you to
get this done, you don't get it when we look at a ...
longer term field life issue as opposed to a very
small short moment in time here ... a point in time in
an early part of a field development."
MR. ALPER replied:
The actual negative cash flow that generates the
operating loss is unchanged and, for the most part, we
are not, in this section anyway, changing how it can
be used. There's other sections of the bill that
we'll get into that might modify how companies could
use their Operating Loss Credits. The way,
philosophically, I would look at it is the Gross Value
Reduction exists to reduce the tax burden on a new
producer that's producing oil at a profit and
therefore would owe taxes and now they're going to owe
less taxes. If that company is losing money for
whatever reason, we have the Net Operating Loss Credit
as a benefit to pay them back for a portion of their
losses. What we've found is circumstances where
they're able to use both and magnify the size of their
Operating Loss Credit through using this new oil
benefit ... and it led to unexpected calculations.
Philosophically we can talk a long time, but I think
we'll all benefit from having real numbers before the
committee to show you examples.
2:54:55 PM
REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPHSON noted that in Middle Earth the state is
investing 80 cents versus the taxpayer's 20 cents on any
investment. On the North Slope a company with new oil benefits
from a Net Operating Loss Credit and a second credit bringing
the totality of the state's investment to 120 percent of the
total expense. He posited that the state is paying the company
to generate nothing even though it produced something; it isn't
like a New Explorer Credit where that isn't a phenomenon that
happens. He asked whether the state is actually covering all of
a company's expenses even in circumstances where the company
produces.
MR. ALPER responded that, in part, his answer to this question
is the same as the one he gave to Representative Seaton. It's
not necessarily all of the company's expenses, but it's all of
the company's loss. The state is compensating for more than 100
percent of the company's cash flow loss and that's what this
provision in the bill would fix.
2:56:24 PM
REPRESENTATIVE TARR surmised that for ACES the modeling did not
go high enough on oil prices and for Senate Bill 21 the modeling
did not go low enough. She said she doesn't recall [committee
members] contemplating situations where the large companies
would have net operating loss because this is an unusual
circumstance of very low prices. She inquired whether this is
an accurate statement and could Mr. Alper elaborate in this
regard. She further requested that when DOR does provide the
committee with numbers that it include the range of realities
that might actually be experienced on both ends, given that not
having done this previously has gotten [the state] into some
trouble when unexpected things happened.
MR. ALPER answered there is a psychological bias to assume the
present is going to continue on into the future; it extends to
regular people, academic economists, and everyone in between.
There is always the broad discussion of what could happen. But,
as he said earlier and not everyone agreed, his sense from
having sat as a staffer during the hearings for both of those
bills was that the modeling and day-to-day specifics of the ACES
bill tended to look at a range of prices between $40 and $80
and, as Representative Olson said earlier, didn't really
contemplate what happened if there was a price spike. Senate
Bill 21 tended to focus its conversation on a range of prices
between $80 and $120 and did not fully contemplate and model
what might have occurred at severely lower prices. That is not
to say that people were ignorant of it, but that it wasn't a
prominent part of the conversation.
REPRESENTATIVE TARR asked whether this can we avoided as things
move forward on HB 247. She said she is making an honest
request to look at a broad range of prices and how some of these
changes in the bill would impact things.
MR. ALPER replied it is his sincere hope to go as broad as
possible. He explained that [DOR] used to model general fund
estimates for the year based upon a certain set of assumptions.
Last year [DOR] published one that went between $40 and $140.
The report was updated for this year and now the price goes down
to $20.
2:59:29 PM
CO-CHAIR TALERICO informed members that both Director Alper and
Commissioner Hoffbeck will be compiling more information for the
committee with quite a few more details. He said he will work
directly with the director and the commissioner to give them
enough time to compile those things that were talked about
earlier today.
[HB 247 was held over.]
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| HB247 ver A.pdf |
HRES 2/3/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/5/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/10/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/22/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 6:00:00 PM HRES 3/8/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HB247 Sponsor Statement.pdf |
HRES 2/3/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/5/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/10/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HB247 Sectional Analysis.pdf |
HRES 2/3/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/5/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/10/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/22/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 6:00:00 PM HRES 3/8/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HB247 Fiscal Note - FUNDCAP-OIL & GAS TAX CREDIT FUND-2-1-16.pdf |
HRES 2/3/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/5/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/10/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/22/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 6:00:00 PM HRES 3/8/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HB247 Fiscal Note - DOR-TAX-2-1-16.pdf |
HRES 2/3/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/5/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/10/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/22/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 6:00:00 PM HRES 3/8/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HB 247 Oil Credit Bill - Key Features 2-2-16.pdf |
HRES 2/3/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/5/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/10/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/22/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 6:00:00 PM HRES 3/8/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HB 247 Production Tax Credits FY07-FY25 Excel Table_Figure 8-4_Fall 15 RSB.pdf |
HRES 2/3/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/5/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/10/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/22/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 3/7/2016 6:00:00 PM HRES 3/8/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HSE RES ISER contract for Impacts of Potential Alaska Fiscal Options.pdf |
HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM |
|
| HSE RES 2.9.16 - Impacts of Alaska fiscal options-Summary of preliminary conclusions-Gunnar Knapp.pdf |
HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM |
|
| HSE RES 2.12.16 ISER economic impacts study-preliminary conclusions.pdf |
HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM |
|
| HSE RES 2.12.16 AOGA Sectional Analysis of Governor's Tax Credit Reform Bill HB 247 FINAL.pdf |
HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |
| HSE RES 2.12.16 Professor Gunnar Knapp's ISER Rpt Comments on HB 247.pdf |
HRES 2/12/2016 1:00:00 PM HRES 2/22/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 247 |